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Price volatility, market regulation and risk management: 
challenges for the future of the CAP 
Abstract 
This article provides an analysis of the European Commission’s proposals (18 Novembre 
2010) regarding the next CAP reform. It proposes a reflection centered on the volatility of 
agricultural prices, the market regulation mechanisms and the risk management tools (the 
important question of direct payment to farmers is not included here). The first section deals 
with the factors underlying the volatility of agricultural prices, the effects of these factors on 
an international scale and ways of better managing volatility through enhanced international 
coordination of policies associated with agriculture. The second concerns the European tools 
that could be mobilised to accompany and support the envisaged strategies on a more global 
scale. Arguments are then developed around the following topics: customs duties, export 
refunds, safety nets, futures markets, fiscal policies and income stabilisation tools.  
Keywords: CAP, agricultural market, price volatility, risk, regulation instruments 
JEL classifications: Q10, Q13, Q18 
Volatilité des prix, régulation des marchés et gestion des risques : 
les enjeux pour la future PAC 
Résumé 
Cet article propose une analyse des propositions de la Commission Européenne du 
18 novembre 2010 pour une nouvelle réforme de la PAC. Le propos est centré sur la volatilité 
des prix agricoles, les mécanismes de régulation des marchés et les outils de gestion des 
risques (la question importante des paiments directs aux agriculteurs n’est pas abordée ici). La 
première section s’intéresse aux facteurs sous-jacents à la volatilité des prix agricoles, à leurs 
impacts à l’échelle internationale et aux possibilités de mieux gérer la volatilité grâce à une 
meilleure coordination internationale des politiques affectant le secteur agricole. La deuxième 
section met l’accent sur les outils qui pourraient être mobilisés dans l’Union européenne pour 
accompagner et soutenir les stratégies envisagées à une échelle plus globale. Une discussion 
est enfin conduite autour des sujets suivants : les droits de douane, les restitutions à l’export, 
les filets de sécurités, les marchés à terme, les politiques fiscales et les instruments de 
stabilitsation des revenus. 
Mots-clefs : PAC, marchés agricoles, volatilité des prix, risque, instruments de régulation 
Classifications JEL : Q10, Q13, Q18   Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°11-04 
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Price volatility, market regulation and risk management: 
challenges for the future of the CAP 
1.  Introduction 
On 18 November 2010 the European Commission presented a communication on the future of 
the common agricultural policy (CAP) towards 2020 (European Commission, 2010a). The 
communication was placed under the authority of the Commissioner responsible for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (Dacian Ciolos) and was addressed to the European 
Parliament (Adinolfi, Little and Massot, 2010), the Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Prior to the publication of the text, the 
Commissioner organised a broad public consultation to gather the thoughts expressed by 
European citizens and various organisations (European Commission, 2010b; Bureau, 2010). 
These new proposals, which are part of the continuing reforms that have taken place over the 
two previous decades (Burell, 2009; Matthews, 2010; Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 2011), 
convey the European Commission’s strategic vision on the development of agriculture and its 
place in society. According to the European Commission, the future CAP must satisfy the 
following three objectives at the same time: promoting healthy and adequate food production 
for European consumers in a context of global demand growth, economic crisis and high price 
volatility; contributing to sustainable management of natural resources, while taking into 
account the problems associated with climate change; encouraging the maintenance of 
territorial balances by accepting the idea that agriculture is a crucial factor in invigorating the 
rural environment. 
The communication is a policy guidance document. The proposals made are therefore not, at 
least at this stage, a precise regulatory text which could form the subject of a detailed analysis 
of the impact in terms of reorienting support between Member States, the sensitivity of the 
incomes of the different categories of farms or incentives for changes in production. Once the 
institutional debate has been completed (De Castro et al., 2011), regulatory texts will be 
adopted to implement a reform of the CAP from 2014. It is important to point out that this 
communication was drawn up with the intention of, firstly, taking into account the 
commitments made in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO) multilateral 
negotiations (Blandford et al., 2010; Swinbank, 2008) and, secondly, orienting the future 
CAP towards the priorities set out by the President of the European Commission in his 
communication of 3  March  2010 entitled ‘Europe 2020’ (European Commission, 2010c). 
Seeking to make the future CAP consistent with the Europe 2020 strategy is naturally a Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°11-04 
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priority in so far as the latter will have a significant influence on the choices that will be made 
regarding the future keys to allocating EU budgetary resources in the financial framework for 
2014-2020. 
In this context, this article is divided in two sections. The first one deals with the volatility of 
agricultural prices, considering that the future CAP instruments, however innovative they are, 
will have to be in line with an internationally agreed strategy. The second one discusses the 
proposals made regarding the future tools that could be mobilised internally in order to 
regulate the agricultural markets and deal with risk and crisis situations as well as possible. 
 
2.  Price volatility and international coordination  
In its text of 18 November 2010, the European Commission highlights the extent to which 
growing price volatility of agricultural products and inputs (FAO, 2011; Gilbert and Morgan, 
2010) is currently a problem for European farmers (Capitanio, 2010). It causes major 
variations in income and contributes to a growing concern that does not in any way favour 
making the necessary long-term commitments (establishment and investment) that this 
activity requires. Alongside the measures that will be adopted specifically in the context of 
the CAP (see section 3), the EU authorities will also have to be actively involved in better 
international coordination of this issue; the work undertaken in the G20 (under the French 
Presidency) is also intended to contribute to this. 
 
  2.1.  Price volatility accentuates the hunger problem 
The research conducted by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United 
Nations shows that the phenomenon of international food price volatility has worsened, 
particularly over the last four years. The FAO combined food price index, which is calculated 
on the basis of the prices of 55 products, rose to 118 in January 2006 (it was an average of 
100 in 2002-2004), and 213 in June 2008, then dropped to 139 in March 2009, and finally 
rose again to 232 in April 2011. Not only is price volatility serious, but the higher levels are 
reaching peaks that have never been seen before on the international markets. 
This high level of price volatility is expressed in contrasting ways by different products: in the 
case of sugar, the changes are spectacular: the index increased from 131 in June 2007 to 348 
in April 2011; in the case of cereals, it dropped from 274 in April 2008 to 157 in September Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°11-04 
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2009, then rose to 265 in April 2011 (Wright, 2011); in the case of milk, it peaked at 268 in 
November 2007, dropped to 117 in March 2009, then rose to 229 in April 2011; in the meat 
sector, the range is smaller: from 137 in September 2008 to 114 in April 2009, then to 173 in 
April 2011. Another approach to price volatility, taken from the perspective of the situation 
observed in the different European agricultural markets, leads to a quite similar diagnosis: the 
price of wheat has more than doubled in three years; the price of milk has fluctuated in an 
almost identical proportion to wheat; the price of beef has dropped compared with 2006, with 
smaller variations than in other sectors. For meat, the current problem mainly relates to the 
increase in production costs (feed) as a result of the rise in prices of crops. 
In addition to its effects on the financial situations of European farmers, the price volatility of 
food products is even more problematic given that it enhances the situation of food insecurity 
in many developing countries where food expenditure often represents a very large proportion 
of the household budget (FAO, 2009). It is occurring in a context in which, firstly, several 
dozen countries are already facing a recurring food crisis situation (sometimes with high 
social tensions or ‘food riots’) and, secondly, there are already nearly a billion humans on the 
planet facing malnutrition (63% of whom are in Asia and the Pacific, 26% in sub-Saharan 
Africa, 5% in South America and the Caribbean, 4% in the Middle East and North Africa and 
1% in developed countries). Under-nourishment particularly affects rural populations in 
developing countries and two thirds of it is found in only seven countries (in descending 
order): India, China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan and 
Ethiopia. 
The battle against price volatility cannot be limited to a single continent or a single economic 
area, even an agriculturally powerful one such as the EU (the leading global importer and 
exporter of agricultural and food products). It must be a collective ambition shared by the 
main big players in the production of, consumption of and trade in agricultural products 
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  2.2.  The factors underlying the volatility of agricultural prices 
It is not possible to reflect on the high level of volatility of agricultural prices without going 
back to the specific characteristics of the sector, as is widely discussed in the work of 
economists  (Boussard, 2010; Gérard, 2008; Gouel, 2011): i) due to the rather lengthy 
production cycle, agricultural supply is quite inelastic in the short term; this means that 
farmers cannot react immediately to market signals; ii) agricultural and food products are 
largely perishable; that means that it is more difficult to store them (in the medium and long 
term) than in the industrial goods sector, where the practice is common; iii) the agricultural 
produce available at year n+1, in a country or on the international market, is difficult to 
predict during year n inasmuch as its level still depends (despite technical progress) largely on 
climate conditions (drought, flood, hail, etc.); iv) the demand for food products is relatively 
inelastic in relation to price: a slight surplus of supply compared with demand results in a 
more than proportional drop in prices. 
In addition to recognising these specific characteristics, international decision-makers need to 
agree fully on the fact that price volatility in agriculture is the result of a complex interplay of 
climate, demographic, political, economic and/or logistical factors (Timmer, 2010; Jamet 
2011). Several of these factors play a dominant role, which needs to be taken on board before 
working together to plan how to curb the volatility: 
-  The growth of the world population and the change in diets are placing major pressure 
on demand for agricultural commodities. As the UN forecasts show, the global 
population is expected to reach 9.1 billion people by 2050, which is an increase of 
2.3  billion people compared with the current situation; this expected population 
growth, which is already at a rate of 220 000 people per day, will mainly be due to 
African countries (+1  billion people) and Asian countries (+1  billion). This rapid 
increase in the number of consumers is in addition to a change in their dietary 
preferences (especially in emerging countries where it is economically possible) 
towards an increase in individual consumption of animal proteins. For example, 
annual consumption of meat products in China increased from 13 kg per inhabitant in 
1980 to just under 60 kg in 2010.  
-  The vagaries of the climate sometimes have severe effects on the production of 
particular goods. The impact on international agricultural prices is even greater when 
the countries affected play an active role in the international flow of trade in the 
goods. For example, the climate problems (drought) encountered in Australia certainly Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°11-04 
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contributed to the sharp rise in the price of dairy products in so far as it supplies nearly 
12% of the global market; in the cereals sector, the 2010 supply was disrupted by fires 
in Russia (which led to an embargo on cereal exports), a heat wave in Ukraine and 
heavy rain in Canada. While climate factors are likely to be accentuated by global 
warming, global warming needs to be the subject of an international strategy that goes 
far beyond the ambitions of the CAP in this area. 
-  The increase in energy prices (oil, gas, etc.) interferes with the price of agricultural 
products through four main channels: i) it causes a rise in the production costs of 
agricultural goods, although the level varies for different categories of products; in the 
same way, for a given agricultural product, the use of inputs fluctuates depending on 
the production methods and techniques used; ii) it influences domestic and 
international transport costs for agricultural products; iii) it economically supports 
exporting countries, which are then inclined to import agricultural products at higher 
prices; iv) the impact of energy prices on world agricultural markets is also influence 
by the role of macro-economic linkages (Gohin and Chantret, 2010). 
-  A growing proportion of crop production being diverted from its prime function 
(human and animal food) towards biofuels is accentuating the pressure on crop 
product markets (Banse et al., 2010; Baffes, 2011). Biofuels are not, however, solely 
responsible for the rise in food prices. Two arguments back-up this statement: the 
price of cereals declined sharply in 2009 compared with 2007-2008, while global 
production of biofuels continued to rise; the price of certain food products (including 
rice) increased (particularly in 2007-2008), despite having no immediate link with the 
development of ethanol and/or biodiesel. The land used to produce biofuels represents 
2% of the cultivable land on the planet. 
-  International agricultural prices are determined mainly on the basis of the quantities of 
goods traded rather than the goods produced. In the case of a product for which trade 
represents a small proportion of global production and exports come from a small 
number of countries, the pressure can sometimes be high, mainly in the following two 
cases: where the countries supplying the global market experience a sudden 
contraction in their supply (climate problem, health crisis, etc.); where the 
consumption of the item varies suddenly, or at least more rapidly than anticipated at 
the time production was started. In a context characterised by a growing integration of 
economies, the balances are now increasingly fragile as the purchasing countries Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°11-04 
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generally assume that the global market will be able to satisfy domestic demand 
without the need to establish and finance reserve. 
-  The influence of financial speculation on changes in the prices of agricultural 
commodities (level and volatility) is the subject of rich and sometimes fierce technical 
debates (Sanders et al., 2010; Irwin and Sanders, 2011). At least until now it was 
generally accepted that speculation was not the prime cause of rises or falls in 
agricultural prices (Guyomard, 2008); the imbalance between supply and demand was 
still the main explanation, according to the majority of experts. It was also accepted 
that speculation had more effect on short-term price fluctuations than on long-term 
price trends. In addition, many experts agree that the existence of a derivatives market 
(as a place for exchanging promises to buy and sell in the long term) is necessary 
(within certain frameworks) in so far as it allows operators to protect themselves from 
excessive volatility. The main challenge then lies in regulating these markets so that 
the signals coming from them are clear and the derivative markets retain a degree of 
proximity to the real economy. In this respect, the development of commodity index 
funds could lead to a risk of speculative bubbles if they move too far from the reality 
of the balance of the markets or stocks. The following example illustrates this 
reasoning: when investment funds speculate up, purchasers rush to buy while sellers 
delay their sales, all of which is based on a shared conviction that the speculator is 
making its decisions with a full knowledge of the facts. The question is, therefore, 
whether that is really still the case. Since summer 2010, and in the light of recent 
experiences, the debates on speculation are becoming more polarised. For example, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food considers that a significant 
proportion of the rise in prices of agricultural products since 2010 is explained by the 
emergence of a speculative bubble (De Schutter, 2010). In a context where wheat 
harvests allowed stocks to be rebuilt to quite a high level, he considers that the current 
developments are quite directly influenced by the entry onto the market of powerful 
institutional investors such as speculative funds, pension funds and investment banks. 
The United Nations therefore consider that the recent sharp rise in food prices (which, 
incidentally, affects rice less than wheat and sugar), is more attributable to a panic 
movement on the agricultural markets (enhanced by a fear that prices will be 
increasing) than to an established serious imbalance between supply and demand. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°11-04 
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In a long-term strategy on the subject of managing agricultural price volatility, the EU 
authorities must aim not only to work internally through the CAP tools (see section 3), but 
also (and perhaps most importantly) externally, in close cooperation with the other big 
powers, mainly those that are part of the G20 or the WTO. It would be futile to seek to 
confine this issue solely to the geographical area of the EU, as the risks are so high and the 
international interdependence is so strong. 
 
  2.3.  A priority: the agricultural development of developing countries  
Due to the expected population growth in many developing countries that are net importers of 
agricultural products, the low level of buying power of the populations concerned and the 
existing social tensions, it is essential that these countries, especially those on the African 
continent, are given the resources to develop their own agriculture while being shielded from 
international competition. The reverse strategy, which would involve favouring the systematic 
channel of low-price imports on the global market is quite simply perilous in the medium and 
long term, for two reasons: some countries that are currently exporters of agricultural goods 
will not necessarily be exporters in the future due to the growth of their populations (such as 
some Asian countries that export rice), more difficult soil and climate conditions (global 
warming, erosion, etc.), the use of agricultural produce for other purposes (biofuels, 
biomaterials, etc.) or the rise in oil prices (which contributes to a rise in transport costs); the 
increase in agricultural commodity prices could then shut out the most economically fragile 
countries. That increase could, for example, be stimulated by China, where the reserves of 
American dollars are as great as resources in terms of water and cultivable land are limited. In 
order to take early action to prevent this phenomenon, it would seem that the EU authorities 
need to act with other international players in the following two directions:  
i)  Giving the opportunity to a specific list of countries, which does not necessarily 
correspond to the WTO list of Least Developed Countries (LDCs), to apply customs 
duties that are sufficiently dissuasive for the development of food-producing farms to 
become economically profitable again (WFP, 2009; Pisani and Chatellier, 2010). They 
are not (or no longer) profitable due to the substantial gaps in productivity between 
those countries and developed countries. Such a choice can only be made, however, 
through transition phases, because it will result in an increase in food prices (which 
will surely require the adoption of consumption support policies). Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°11-04 
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ii)  Encouraging investments in the agricultural sectors in those countries, so that 
productivity can increase significantly. Many experts consider that the public funds 
allocated to agriculture have often been the victim of structural adjustment policies 
imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In the same way, a decreasing 
proportion of the funds from public development aid is directed towards agriculture. 
The issue of the appropriateness of direct investments in developing countries in 
Africa is an important point, which must be considered on a case-by-case basis: 
investment projects that positively involve local populations can have beneficial long-
term effects on the local productive dynamics; investments based on the 
monopolisation of agricultural land by Asian or Persian Gulf countries for purely 
commercial ends are more debatable. 
 
  2.4.  Supply, trade, biofuel and stocks  
In an international framework, which does not, however exclude initiatives specific to the 
CAP, several actions could be useful for limiting the effects of excessive price volatility: 
-  Developing the agriculture of the country or economic area concerned, while ensuring 
that it is environmentally friendly (in order to be sustainable), less sensitive to the 
vagaries of the climate (which raises the question as to the potential future role of 
genetically modified plants) and less dependent on fossil fuels (to prevent the risk of a 
major future increase in production costs). While European consumers can take the 
risk of being in lasting deficit for some exotic products (coffee, tea, cocoa, etc.) or 
little-consumed products (mutton), the situation is very different for key products. In 
fact this strategy carries the risk that the expectations of the EU market will not always 
be fully satisfied: a health crisis, a poor harvest, an increase in consumption, currency 
disruptions or an exacerbated increase in competition could affect the expected flows 
of imports; this is especially true in cases where the number of suppliers is limited, 
such as in the beef sector. 
-  Promoting flows of trade between countries in deficit and countries in surplus (Diaaz-
Bonilla and Ron, 2010). The idea needs to be accepted that some countries will not 
always easily be able to develop their agricultural production so that it is perfectly in 
line with demand. Over the coming decades, this situation could be aggravated in 
some Asian countries that are experiencing high demographic and economic growth Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°11-04 
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while their land availability is poor. The inequality between the world’s countries (in 
terms of population, land, climate, etc.) has thus resulted in growth in agricultural and 
food trade at an annual average rate of 3% since the creation of General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 (WTO, 2010); this rate is higher than the growth of 
global agriculture production (Josling et al., 2010). In the same way, the FAO and 
OECD forecasts show that these flows of agricultural products will increase over the 
next decade (OECD-FAO, 2010), firstly towards developing countries. For developing 
countries, imports of wheat in 2019 are expected to 25% higher than in 2007-2009; 
this growth will be particularly strong (+60%) for protein meal (exports of soya beans 
from South American to Asia) and vegetable oils (+40%). Without predicting currency 
parities trends, the EU should be in a position to develop its exports in some 
agricultural sectors (European Commission, 2010d); these exports are expected to be 
more limited than trade flows within the EU.  
-  Introducing a degree of flexibility into the annual production of biofuels that takes into 
account the real situation of the markets for human and animal food. This possibility is 
particularly relevant to the production of grain maize in the United States and 
production of cereals and oil seeds in the EU. Due to the industrial investments in this 
sector, such an approach is not, however, simple to envisage, at least not without the 
support of the public authorities. 
-  Promoting, as far as possible, a dietary model that is less resource-hungry (i.e. less 
meat and more vegetables or cereals); this implies some changes in education, but it is 
not so easy to succeed. The rapid increase in consumption of animal proteins, 
particularly in emerging countries and some developing countries (with the notable 
exception of India), is accentuating the pressure on the agricultural markets; what is 
more, this would become quite untenable if the United States model became 
widespread (127  kg of meat products per inhabitant). In the EU, the individual 
consumption of meat products is declining in several countries and increasing in 
others (mainly the new Member States) so that the overall trend is only marginally 
increasing. Based on similar reasoning, particular attention must be paid, on an 
international (but also European) scale, to the wastage of part of agricultural 
production all along the chain from producer to consumer. 
-  Creating international food security stocks for certain agricultural products (including 
cereals) where that is possible from a technical and budgetary point of view. Due to 
the controversies that the concept of ‘stocks’ create, both within circles of economists Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°11-04 
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and among public decision-makers, it is important to make it clear what meaning is 
being attached to that concept here (HLPE, 2011). The creation of stocks must be 
envisaged mainly for the benefit of the countries where there are regular food 
shortages and where the conditions for access to agricultural products are difficult for 
a variety of reasons, including logistical ones. The conditions for access to food in 
some poor countries are often very detrimental to local populations even if there is not 
really a global shortage of supply; the challenge is then essentially the geographical 
distribution of food commodities. Such stocks, which must be considered to be 
compatible with the WTO rules, could be co-financed by the countries and the 
international monetary and financial institutions; the stocks would be used, according 
to well-established rules, at the request of the governments of the countries concerned 
and, if necessary, with the technical support of the appropriate local organisations. As 
establishing public stocks is expensive and trade in agricultural products has a role to 
play in regulating the balance between supply and demand, the aim should not be to 
create massive public stocks to help support international agricultural prices. Various 
past experiences have shown that this approach was not only difficult to implement on 
an international scale (in so far as not all countries have the same definition of risk), 
but ineffective from a strictly economic point of view (Gilbert and Brunetti, 1996). 
 
  2.5.  The governance of the agricultural markets and speculation 
The main question here is how international decision-makers can act collectively to prevent 
and manage the instability of the agricultural markets. This supposes, firstly, that they can 
and, secondly, that they want to, with as much cooperation as possible between countries or 
large economic areas. During the current decade, many ambitions should be pursued and 
upheld by the EU authorities. 
The first ambition must be to tackle in more detail the issue of the conditions for better global 
governance of agriculture and food. International organisations that work in these two fields, 
whether in a specialised way or not, are diverse and pursue their own objectives (FAO, WTO, 
the World Bank, the World Food Programme (WFP), etc.). One of the main limitations of the 
system is that, at least currently, there is no competent political body with powers to 
coordinate the actions of these different players in the best way. Interesting proposals have Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°11-04 
 
  13 
been made in this respect in a recent report produced under the authority of the President of 
the French Financial Markets Authority (Jouyet et al., 2010). 
The second ambition must be to establish that the WTO analytical frameworks as decided at 
the Uruguay Round Agricultural Agreements (URAA) in 1994 are no longer necessarily 
relevant fiftheen years later. Without questioning the benefit to consumers in numerous 
countries of an increased opening up of the agricultural markets, and while accepting the idea 
that the WTO will have to play a role in regulating the agricultural markets, we must improve 
many imperfections in the multilateral trade system: 
i)  Developing countries that are net importers of agricultural products (especially in 
Africa) must be able to increase their commercial protection in order to develop their 
own agricultural production (and not rely on increasingly large imports). 
ii)  The positive environmental contributions of agriculture, particularly of herbivore 
rearing (land maintenance, carbon storage in pastures, landscape creation, biodiversity 
maintenance, etc.), should be taken into greater account at the WTO so that the 
expected positive effects of liberalisation (lowering prices for consumers, etc.) are not 
cancelled out by future environmental deterioration, which will certainly generate 
costs to the community. This highlights the extent to which the WTO’s trade concerns 
are insufficiently interlinked with other aims, which are nevertheless just as important 
for the future of humanity, and addressed with so much conviction in other 
international bodies (combating climate change, etc.). This also means that seeking an 
optimum allocation of resources in the agricultural sector, however attractive it may be 
to the economist responsible for calculating the resulting benefits, also has serious 
limitations (Kroll, 2007). It could result in such a high geographical concentration of 
supply that the environmental effects could be globally appalling for the planet 
(pollution and soil erosion, abandonment of agricultural land); in the same way, a very 
high concentration accentuates the potential sensitivity of agricultural supply to the 
vagaries of the climate and health risks, which has a de facto negative influence on 
price volatility. 
iii)  Given the intensity of the food crisis and the expected increase in global population, 
the future WTO agricultural agreement must of course continue to work to achieve 
increased fluidity of trade (Brockmeier and Pelikan, 2008), but also, and most 
importantly, towards alleviating the price volatility of agricultural commodities. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°11-04 
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However innovative the future CAP is in terms of regulating the markets, the efforts 
made in the EU will be even more successful if they are consistent with the future 
WTO guidelines; these guidelines must give increasing space to so-called ‘non-
commercial’ concerns such as food security, health security and the environment. 
The third ambition, which is at the heart of the current G20 objectives, must be to arrive at a 
stricter framework for speculation on agricultural commodities (while not calling into 
question what is working well). The aim is to restore confidence to the various operators and 
prevent the creation of speculative bubbles. While a number of possibilities considered are 
heading in the right direction (FAO and OCDE, 2011), their future impact will depend a great 
deal on their specific methods of application and on the level of support from the countries 
concerned. The following are among the possibilities raised: improving the quality of the 
statistics available (past data and forecasts) on the agricultural markets (production, 
consumption, trade, stocks, climate, etc.) so that those involved are acting with the benefit of 
the most reliable information possible; providing a political warning system for risk 
situations, distinguishing the physical markets from the financial markets (so that the 
warnings are quickly followed by actions); making over-the-counter derivatives operations 
more transparent; limiting the number of forward positions that an institutional investor may 
hold on a single commodity, in order to prevent orders for that commodity from having a 
decisive influence on whether the international price rises or falls. 
 
3.  Agricultural market regulation 
The European Commission’s proposals regarding the CAP towards 2020 were drawn up after 
noting that it would be useful to maintain certain market support mechanisms. The proposals 
also specify that the future reform must be an opportunity to streamline and simplify existing 
tools (Grant, 2010) and also to establish new rules concerning the functioning of the 
agricultural and food chain. To contribute to these debates, this section offers a reflection on 
the four following points: customs duties and protection at the borders; export refunds; 
intervention tools and safety nets; risk management instruments. 
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3.1.  Customs duties and protection at the borders 
At this stage of the multilateral negotiations in the (delayed) Doha Round it has been agreed 
that the future reduction in customs duties on agricultural and food products would be applied 
according to what is called a ‘tiered’ formula. This means that, at least for developed 
countries, a 50% reduction in customs duties is foreseen (compared with a past reference 
period) for products whose final consolidated tariff or the equivalent ad valorem would be 
below 20%; this reduction would be 57% for the bracket between 20% and 50%; 64% for the 
bracket between 50% and 75%; and 70% for the bracket exceeding 70%. For developing 
countries, the reductions would be lower. The sensitivity of different European agricultural 
products to this possible future reduction in customs duties is not standard, as the difference 
between the EU price and the international price varies from one product to another. While 
consolidated duty on agricultural and food products stands at an EU average of just under 
20%, it surpasses the 80% threshold for products such as sugar, beef and butter. Focusing on a 
selection of three agricultural products (beef, milk and cereals) will help to gain a better 
understanding of what is at stake. 
In the beef sector, the EU price is generally significantly higher than that of the large 
exporting countries, including Brazil (which alone represents 40% of international trade); the 
most recent observations show, however, that the price of beef has increased rapidly in Brazil, 
where economic growth is pushing consumption up. In this sector, customs duties applied at 
the EU borders are still substantial: 12.8% of the value and 3 €/kg for boned, chilled and 
frozen meat. With the exception of the possible classification of the ‘beef’ tariff headings as 
‘sensitive products’ (products benefiting, by way of exception, from a lower reduction in 
customs duties), a large reduction in tariff protection prompts the fear of downward pressure 
on the price of EU beef. The EU has been in deficit for beef since 2003 (imports represent 6% 
of domestic consumption), and is expected to experience a further deterioration in its trade 
balance over the next decade (due especially to a decrease in the number of dairy cows).This 
situation is expected to lead the EU authorities to increase imports (through quotas negotiated 
at the WTO or a bilateral agreement with the Mercosur countries). 
In the European dairy sector, imports from third countries represent less than 2% of EU 
consumption; this is mainly as part of tariff quotas that are only partially used. There are still 
quite high customs duties at the EU borders: 1 900 €/t for butter; 950 €/t for skimmed milk 
powder, 1 500 €/t for cheese. For convenience products (milk desserts, cheese, etc.), the risks 
of imports rising are quite low for at least three reasons: the products are perishable and Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°11-04 
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difficult to transport; European companies have a great deal of technological know-how; and 
European consumers are quite attached to local products. While the risks of an increase in 
imports are more significant for industrial dairy products, many factors could limit the extent 
of those risks: difficult climate conditions make it more improbable for Australian exports to 
increase; the high demand for dairy products in Asian countries should monopolise the New 
Zealand market to a significant extent, with New Zealand’s hopes for the growth of milk 
production now being more limited; the removal of milk quotas will probably result in a drop 
in the EU price of industrial dairy products, while, at the same time, forecasting bodies are 
anticipating an increase in the international price (FAPRI, 2010). 
In the European cereals sector, imports are at a low level in proportion to the volumes 
produced (2%). Over recent years, international competitors have not increased their trade 
pressure on the EU, in a global market in which demand is growing and the development of 
biofuels is having a negative impact on exportable quantities (in particular for American grain 
maize). In this sector, a combination of several factors means that any future reduction in 
customs duties would not be very problematic: the reduction in guaranteed prices has brought 
the European price closer to the international price so that the duties applied have now 
become low or zero; consolidated historical duties have been set at a high level; aside from 
some major fluctuations, the underlying international price of cereals is on an upwards trend. 
With 23% of global agricultural and food imports (excluding intra-EU trade), the EU is not 
the ‘fortress’ that some competitor countries sometimes say it is. It is the leading importer, 
ahead of the three NAFTA countries (14%), Japan (10%) and China (7%). Moreover, 
European imports of agricultural and food products are constantly growing (in volume and 
value) as the years go by. As well as tropical products, soya and sheep products, for which 
imports are historically high, the EU is also slightly in deficit in poultry, beef and grain maize. 
While a further reduction in customs tariffs would not necessarily change the level of 
European cereal or milk imports, the risk is, however, higher in the meat sector. Rather than a 
further general reduction in tariff protection, the WTO negotiators should focus their efforts 
on the following two points: taking more account of non-commercial concerns; seeking a 
better balance between the objective of high fluidity of trade and the long-term preservation, 
for each economic area, of balances that are helpful to all societies: the quality of the 
environment, maintaining the land and food security. 
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3.2.  Export refunds 
According to the notification reports presented to the WTO, the EU is the economic area that 
has used export refunds the most over the last decade; this budgetary support from the CAP is 
allocated to European businesses to encourage them to export agricultural and food products 
to third countries (mainly benefiting dairy products, sugar, pork and poultry); without this 
support, they were not competitive, given the significant price difference between the EU 
market and the global market. Since the CAP reform in 1992, the level of export refunds has 
been significantly reduced in the EU: it has fallen from EUR 10 billion in 1990 to less than 
EUR 1 billion since 2009. Three factors explain this drastic reduction: the drop in institutional 
prices; the reduction in export volumes (beef, poultry, etc.); the stricter framework for the 
rules for granting this support as part of the URAA. 
As the commitments made as part of the Doha Round currently stand, the WTO Member 
States must eliminate all forms of export subsidies by the end of 2013. This change will result 
in the EU being without a tool that, particularly in a crisis period, enabled surplus supply to be 
released onto the international market and thus to help stabilise its markets. This tool proved 
to be useful when the guaranteed prices were fixed at a high level, but expensive in that it 
encouraged producers to constantly produce more, even if the internal market was already 
saturated. The abandonment of this tool justifies intervention prices being fixed at quite a low 
level. 
This future removal of refunds should not, however, threaten the EU’s dominant position on 
the international agricultural and food markets. The EU-27 has 20% of global export trade, 
despite unfavourable currency parity with the US dollar. It is therefore ahead of NAFTA 
(17%) and Mercosur (16%). All these areas are seeing an increase in their exports (but for the 
countries of South America the rise is more spectacular). The future growth of European 
exports will depend on the following main factors: economic growth in the emerging 
countries where land is scarce; the gradual slowing down of exporting by competing countries 
(due to climate factors, rise in internal consumption, development of biofuels, etc.); the 
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3.3.  Intervention tools and safety nets 
The European Commission’s proposals mention a possible adaptation of the intervention 
rules. This adaptation could include the extension of the intervention period, the application 
of the market disruption clause and private storage to other products. It is nevertheless clearly 
reaffirmed that the intervention instrument should only be used as a safety net to be deployed 
in the event of a price crisis or disruption of the market. The public authorities may store 
certain agricultural products when their market price falls below thresholds established in 
advance. The stocks resulting from these purchases are then released onto the international or 
EU market, sometimes under the food aid to the most deprived person’s scheme (European 
Council, 2007). Fixed-price purchases are now applied only in the case of certain products 
(common wheat, butter and milk powder) and to quantities determined in advance. Beyond 
these quantities, the purchase price and quantities offered for intervention are established by 
the European Commission under the ‘tendering’ procedure. The EU authorities also have the 
option of encouraging private storage, through targeted aid. By focusing the analysis on a 
selection of agricultural products, it is possible to discuss about the intervention system in 
more precise detail. 
For beef, public intervention is opened if, for a period of two consecutive weeks, the average 
market price is less than 1 560 €/t in a country or region (for an R3 calf or steer). Private 
storage aid is also possible if the prices are below 2 300 €/t. These thresholds are at such a 
low level that the use of the intervention mechanism is becoming less and less probable, 
especially in a context where there is an EU beef deficit, a decline in Brazilian exports over 
the recent period and an increase in the price of beef in several exporting countries. Due to the 
increase in production costs in this sector and the already low level of income, it is to be 
hoped that beef cattle farmers will not have to benefit from this scheme. 
For sheep meat and goat meat, private storage aid may be granted under particularly difficult 
market conditions. The EU’s deficit situation means using imports mainly from New Zealand, 
as part of annual quotas agreed by the WTO. The future income of sheep and goat farmers 
will depend more on changes in the way the support is granted and the technical performance 
of farms than on the intervention system. 
For pigmeat, public intervention was recently abandoned, in so far as it was no longer used. 
Consumption, production and exports of pigmeat continue to rise in the EU, although the pace 
varies widely between countries. This sector will be sensitive to the future abandonment of Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°11-04 
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export refunds, which sometimes gave European exporters the opportunity to conquer markets 
(Russia, Japan, Hong Kong or South Korea) against American opponents favoured by their 
currency’s parity with the Euro. 
In the dairy sector, intervention is restricted to 30 000 t annually for butter (at a price of 
2 218 €/t) and to 109 000 t for skimmed milk powder (at a price of 1 700 €/t). The European 
Commission may, if necessary, make these purchases by tender; in this case, the maximum 
price cannot exceed the intervention price. In 2009, private storage aid for butter was 
maintained (but not for cheese) while processing aid for butter was abolished. Two categories 
of processing aid (skimmed milk powder for animal feed and skimmed milk made into casein 
or caseinate) are still allocated, but only when the market is in surplus and according to an 
amount established in advance or by tender. Following the crisis affecting the dairy sector in 
2009, the EU authorities made use of all the possibilities offered by these remaining 
regulation mechanisms. Exceptional measures were also agreed, such as bringing forward the 
disbursement period for direct payments and the implementation of a programme to promote 
dairy products. In this sector, one of the key questions is the extent to which the contractual 
relations mechanism that will soon be put in place to replace the current system of milk 
quotas will be effective in maintaining an optimum balance between supply and demand. 
In cereals, public intervention potentially concerns common wheat, durum wheat, corn, 
barley, rice and sorghum; it is authorised between 1  November and 31  May for all the 
Member States. The latter five crops will, however, no longer be eligible for intervention 
measures, as the rate has been reduced to 0%. For common wheat, the intervention price is 
101.31 €/t, within a limit of 3 million tons. Given the level of prices at the beginning of 2011 
and the trends forecast for the next financial year (position of buyers), it seems quite clear that 
public intervention will not be very useful in this sector in the short and medium term. The 
intervention price is set at a level that provides so little incentive that it only has a small 
impact on supply. 
As the reforms of the CAP have taken place, the intervention instruments have been 
significantly changed. The budgetary cost of these tools has also become extremely low in 
comparison to the direct aid allocated to European farmers. Preserving these instruments is 
definitely useful for tackling any crises that arise, but the low thresholds lead us to consider 
that the less these ‘safety nets’ are used, the better farmers will be. The objective must be to 
avoid using them by better adapting supply to demand. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°11-04 
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3.4.  Risk management instruments 
In agriculture, the risks can be classified into three groups: a) risks associated with 
fluctuations in the prices of goods sold or inputs purchased; b) risks attributable to the 
production cycle, such as the vagaries of the climate (drought, frost, hail, etc.), incidents (fire, 
water damage, theft, etc.), disease (plant and animal) or life events (illness, disability, death); 
c) risks related to the industry, i.e., the capacity of farmers to market their produce. In order to 
limit or better manage these risks, farmers can adopt tailored strategies (diversification, 
multiannual investment management, etc.) or leave it to the various existing tools (fiscal 
policy, insurance markets, financial markets). 
Risk management instruments, which are more developed in the United States or Canada than 
in the EU (Capitanio, 2010), may have their origins in the public sphere, private entities or 
professional organisations. In the typologies used to class and rank these instruments, 
particular attention is paid to the correlation between the occurrence of an event (or hazard) 
within a population, on the one hand, and its frequency and intensity, on the other hand. The 
risk is described as systemic when a large section of the population is affected; it is classified 
as independent when only one or a few individuals are affected. 
In order to deal with the inherent risks of agriculture, the development of private risk 
management instruments (insurance, derivative risk management products) must be 
encouraged. The public authorities can contribute to this by making a clear distinction 
between what responsibility the public and private sectors have in dealing with agricultural 
risks, by stabilising their political guidelines for intervention in the agricultural markets and 
by encouraging an increasing proportion of farmers to educate themselves on these issues. By 
publicly awarding contracts, they can also promote the development of insurance. 
The development of these private risk management instruments does not in any way mean 
that public authorities will no longer have a role to play in agriculture in future. The idea is 
not to set the players (public/private) against each other, but to find the best possible 
interaction between them to serve the desired objectives. With this in mind, the public 
authorities should maintain the safety nets (through public storage and private storage aid); 
strengthen the powers of the market (producer, processor and distributor); ensure that there is 
increased transparency on prices and margins; help to establish contractual relations between 
producers and companies, so that supply can be brought in line with demand; promote 
agriculture that is in tune with the environment and product quality (through the method of Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°11-04 
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allocation of direct aid); and promote balanced development of European land. In the possible 
event of sudden mass imports of agricultural products from third countries, the public 
authorities must also use appropriate mechanisms (safeguard clause) to avoid the risk of 
damaging destabilisation of the existing agricultural industries. 
Without going into too much detail here as to the content and the diversity of the tools that 
farmers could use to manage risk in their businesses (Féménia and Gohin, 2010; Kimura et 
al., 2010), some thoughts follow dealing with several points that are important to add to the 
CAP debate. 
The diversification of agricultural and non-agricultural activities  
The diversification of activities (agricultural and non-agricultural) is often a way for farmers 
to reduce their exposure to risk (particularly the risk of price volatility). The same applies to 
strategies of marketing in short distribution channels in which prices are set more by farmers 
than by the interplay of competition on national and international markets. Exposure to the 
volatility of prices of agricultural products and inputs is not, therefore, the same for all farms. 
Over recent decades, agricultural development has, however, clearly oriented European 
agriculture towards increased specialisation, with a drastic decline in the number of mixed 
crops-livestock units: this was considered to be beneficial in terms of technical expertise and 
economic efficiency. Certain measures under the second pillar of the CAP are certainly likely 
to encourage diversification, and therefore lesser sensitivity to price volatility, but the 
expected overall impact will probably remain modest, as there are so many concomitant 
forces acting on specialisation. 
The inter-annual flexibility of the CAP budget 
The issue of the inter-annual flexibility of the CAP budget should be considered carefully in 
so far as it could enable part of the budget allocated to European agriculture to be adapted 
according to actual needs. The aim is not to question the principle of the multiannual financial 
framework (2014-2020), but to have some freedom (‘security budgetary reserve’) to tackle 
any crisis situations in the best possible way. This recommendation is particularly important 
given that the current system for allocating the single farm payment (SFP) is excessively 
inflexible; for example, it leads public authorities to allocate direct aid to farmers benefiting 
from favourable and profitable prices, while at the same time there is a lack of funds to 
support producers affected by a major decline in prices or a sudden increase in costs.  
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In response to the increased volatility of agricultural sale prices, it seems essential that new 
fiscal policies be constructed in each country. We need to move from annual management of 
performance in farming to multi-annual management. The current system is, at least in some 
EU countries (like in France), still too inflexible. When the price situation is satisfactory, and 
income from farming is good, too often it encourages farmers to invest immediately in order 
to avoid compulsory levies. This reasoning, which is sometimes counter-productive in terms 
of long-term competitiveness, was not too problematic in a context in which prices and 
income were quite stable; it is becoming problematic in a situation of major fluctuations. 
The issue is therefore now about finding the technical means to implement a system that 
would foster the creation of precautionary savings. This mechanism would give farmers 
whose income is high in the current year the opportunity to transfer part of their profit, 
exempt from social insurance contributions and tax, to the profit for the following year. If the 
income for the following year had declined due to the price situation becoming unfavourable, 
the amounts transferred could be incorporated into the income calculation so that the farmer 
would then pay his taxes and contributions. These amounts could also be used for investment, 
but on what would become a more multiannual basis. This precautionary saving could then be 
described, for example, as an ‘investment savings plan’. With this in mind, wouldn’t it be a 
simple system to start with the possibility of transferring all or part of the direct aid 
potentially due for the current year to the following financial year? 
Futures markets 
Public authorities must encourage the development of futures markets, while bearing in mind 
the fact that, firstly, this financial instrument cannot be used for all agricultural products, and 
that, secondly, it does not in any way remove price volatility; in fact it needs price volatility in 
order to function. It is therefore not a tool for regulating the agricultural markets that could 
affect price trends, but rather an instrument that enables farmers to react to the potential effect 
of a deregulation. Aside from these two significant limitations, and in the event of high price 
volatility, futures markets are useful for enabling those involved in a market to cover 
themselves. They give to the concerned farmers the opportunity to anticipate the future 
margin that they will get by having advance knowledge of the sale price of their products; it 
allows farmers to decide to start production, optimise cash-flow management and focus their 
investment strategy. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°11-04 
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The futures markets are still under-developed in the EU (they were only authorised in 1993 in 
France), at least in comparison with the situation in the USA. They essentially relate to crops; 
they are more difficult to apply to animal farms in so far as the instrument requires a high 
level of standardisation of products. In a strict budgetary context, this instrument also has the 
advantage of being inexpensive to public authorities. The potential development of these tools 
is also dependent on the quality of training that can be given to farmers, many of whom are 
not experts in these instruments. 
Multi-risk climate insurance 
The public authorities can encourage farmers to take out multi-risk climate insurance policies; 
these are to cover the risks to production associated with the vagaries of the climate (drought, 
hail, frost, floods and storms). In France, for example, a budget of EUR 133 million was used 
to fund this particular form of support in 2010. The aid takes the form of partial payment of 
eligible insurance premiums up to a limit of 65%. 
Income stabilisation tools 
Due to high prices volatility and the European Commission’s proposals, it is interesting to 
question the conditions for implementing an income stabilisation tool under the second pillar 
of the CAP. Given the broad diversity of farms and of situations in the EU Member States, it 
is surely preferable for this mechanism to be constructed, at least for those who want it, within 
each country (through a common EU framework). Placing this instrument under the second 
pillar of the CAP gives it flexibility and allows co-financing by Member States and 
subsidiarity; it is nevertheless true that this choice could raise some questions among those 
who consider that this instrument falls first and foremost under regulation (and therefore 
under the first pillar). In any case, this ambiguity shows the extent to which it is not 
necessarily easy to build a new CAP structure while keeping the initial framework of the two 
historic pillars. 
To enhance this reflection on income insurance, it would seem appropriate to consider the 
way in which the Canadian authorities recently structured their ‘AgriStability’ programme 
(which replaced the former Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilisation Programme). The 
programme compares the farm’s profit for the current year to the reference profit calculated 
for the previous five years (excluding the highest and the lowest). If the profit is less then 
85% of the calculated average, a payment is triggered. This programme works in a similar 
way to any insurance scheme. A premium, which is payable in advance, is used to cover the Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°11-04 
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coming period. The fee is 0.45% of 85% of the reference profit (plus administration costs). 
There is no compensation if the decline in profit is between 0% and 15%; it is 70% if profits 
drop by between 15% and 30%; it is 80% when profits drop by between 30% and 100%; there 
are particular rules to cover losses and start-up farmers. As well as this Canadian example, the 
ACRE programme (Average Crop Revenue Election) introduced in the United States as part 
of the 2008 Farm Bill is interesting. 
Creating such a mechanism in the EU must be envisaged under two main constraints. The first 
relates to its expected budgetary cost. The indicators used as a reference point need to be well 
selected, then the thresholds and rates need to be set so that the budget that has been 
earmarked is kept to. This requires that statistical studies be conducted, such as those 
published by the European Commission. The second constraint is for the envisaged 
mechanism to be compatible with the commitments made under paragraph 7 of Annex 2 to 
the URAA. This paragraph includes the following two points: the right to receive payments 
on this basis shall be subject to a loss of (agricultural) income exceeds 30% of annual income 
for the three previous years or on a three-year average based on the five previous years 
(excluding the highest and lowest values); the amount of these payments shall compensate 
less than 70% of the producer’s loss of income. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
On 18 November 2010, the European Commissioner responsible for agriculture and rural 
development proposed a new phase in the long process of reforming the CAP. By taking the 
precaution of not entering too quickly into a precise definition of the criteria, indicators or 
thresholds that will ultimately be agreed and which will give shape to the real content of the 
future reform, the Commissioner is first seeking to give it a direction, in a particular context: 
i) the result of the negotiations on the EU financial framework for the 2014-2020 period is 
uncertain; therefore, it is difficult to predict what the future EU budget will be for agriculture 
and rural development; ii) the modification of the support instruments and regulation tools 
must be designed in such a way that the CAP remains compatible with the commitments 
made at the WTO as part of the Doha Round; iii) the European Commission must now work 
in close cooperation with the European Parliament, whose powers have recently been 
enhanced (Massot, 2010). Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°11-04 
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These European Commission proposals were accompanied in December 2010 by additional 
contributions targeting the dairy sector and the quality of agricultural products. While these 
different texts must be considered at the same time, their aim is not to cover all of the issues 
raised today by the development of European farming and the changes in agricultural and 
trade policies. They therefore do not discuss the position that the EU intends to adopt in 
international negotiations on subjects that are important for agriculture such as: changes in 
currency parity; the need for international coordination of agricultural policies in order to 
combat agricultural price volatility; the trade strategy to be adopted towards developing 
countries that are net importers of agricultural products; the best way of taking into account, 
in future WTO agreements, non-commercial concerns (social rules, environmental standards, 
animal welfare); the future development of new technologies (second-generation biofuels, 
genetically modified crops, etc.). Likewise, these texts do not tackle the issue of harmonising 
rules between the Member States of an EU that is heterogeneous and in which there are still 
distortions of competition between countries. 
To enrich the European Commission proposals, it seems important to keep in mind two 
ambitions: agriculture must become capable, in all the countries of the world, of better 
feeding the population (in terms of quantity and quality); it is essential for the balance of 
European society to maintain an agriculture that is both economically effective, 
environmentally friendly and mindful of its relationship to the land. The European authorities 
must be driven by the desire to implement a CAP that is fairer, more sustainable and more 
preventive. In order to do this, they must pay close attention to the specific way in which the 
redistribution of support and targeting it better towards non-commercial goods will be 
implemented. This change in the way that public support is granted is particularly justified in 
that price volatility is increasing and the residual tools for intervention on the agricultural 
markets will have quite a small influence on income levels. It is also important to maintain 
safety nets, to better manage speculation on the agricultural markets, to defend the right to 
minimal customs protection and to encourage farmers who are conducting innovative 
projects. 
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